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I"J THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTJIJ-1

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
EYRH!C RESEll,RCil INSTITUTE,

E:CORPOPl-\TED I
Petitioner,
RESPONDE"JT' S BRIEF
ON APPEAL

-vsTAX COMMISSION OF Tl-IE STATE OF
UTAH, and VER~JON L. HOLMAN, R.

Case No.

15320

ilILTON YORGASON, ELEANOR LEE
BRE!Jcrn:~ and DAVID DUNCMJ as
Cornmissioncors of the Tax Commission
of the State of Utah, UTAH COUNTY
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, and HARRISON
CONOVEH, UT.l\H COUNTY ASSESSOR,
Respondents.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
STATEMENT OF THE tJATURE OF THE CASE

This is a Writ of Review wherein petitioner is seeking
a determination as to the tax exempt status under the Constitution of the State of Utah of a

nonprofit scientific

reac;earci1 organization.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

This matter was first heard by the Board of County
Conunis-:i_oners of Utah County sitting as a Board of Equalization.

-,~ ')ct,,L~r ! ? , 1975, said Board denied tax exempt status to
1 ,,,

u11,l,: 1· the Constitution and statute3 of the State
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l:'

of Utah which held an informal hearing on Jzrnuary 8, 1 ,17 C.
(T. R.

83).

The Tax Commission then held a formal hear 1· ng

March 24, 1976

(T.R.

84-86).

The Tax Cornn1ission render"'d ire

decision on the 13th day of June, 1977

(T.R. 87-92), affirmi

the Utah County Assessor and the County Board of Equalizatio:
assessment of taxes and denying the exempt status to petitiv
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek an affirmation of the decision
denying petitioner the status of a charity entitled to
exemption from the personal property tax laws of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
With the exception of the additional facts set forth
below and any conflict that may arise therefrom, the respendents adopt the Statement of Facts as set forth in
petitioner's brief on appeal.
$10,000 of Eyring Research Institute's profit was
used to directly expand the research caoabili ties of t:ynD;
Research Institute when its president received a $10,000 sa'.
.
·
·th industn
bonus in addition to a salary already in line wi
·
standards.

(T. R.

21).

Petitioner, hereinafter E.R.I., has an
of growth

(T.R.

avo1Jec1 goal
·

17), wherein it holds .itsf•ll c!ll>. to
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,erviccs to anyoi1o who wishes to purchase them within general

.ctandurds of pruc.)ent conduct and within the capabilities of the
petitioner's staff.

To t:1is extent E.R.I. competes in private

enterprise with any other private management and consulting
organizution conducting research.

(T.R. 50).

With the exception of one study conducted for a
rninori ty group, E. R. I. has undertaken no projects to render
assistance and aid on a gratuitous basis to the indigent or
needy or to improve the moral, mental or physical welfare of
the puhlic generally.

(T.R.

44).

E.R.I. performs and willingly accepts research projects for private business enterprises engaged in business
fur profit (T.R.

28-31), who can acquire an exclusive pro-

nrietu:::-y interest in the information developed, which i t can
use to its advantage in the market place and who have in fact
used such information for their pecuniary advantage.

(T. R.

31 and 4:1).

ARGUNEilT
POII17 I

THERE CURI\ENTLY EXISTS NO EXEMPTION FROM THE
TAXATION or THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF A CHARITABLE
CORPOT<l','I'ION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OR STATUTES
OF UT/Ill

;, ' i ·~ 1·

'I

IT,

Section 2 of the Utah Cons ti tut ion now

l l1· · L,-i/:ett ic1n of 011 tanqible property in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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state when i t reads:
All tangible property in the state, not
exempt under the laws of the Uni~te-d--S-ta-tes-
or un<1er this C~msti tut ion, shall be taxed'
in proportion to its value, to be ascertaTned
as provided by law.
(Emphasis added.)
The exemptions which could conceivably be found to
be applicable to Eyring's operation could be either the
following provision governing real property,
• lots with the buildings thereon used
exclusively for either religious worship or
charitable purposes.
.shall be exempt from
taxation.
Art. XIII §2.
or the permissive grant to the legislature which reads:
• The Legislature may provide for the
exemption from taxation of homes, homesteads,
and personal property, not to exceed $2,000 in
value for homesteads, and all household furnishings,
fixtures and equipment used exclusively by the
owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining
a home for himself and family.
Art. XIII ~2.
The latter provision is an ambiguous sentence which
can be construed in different ways.

One possibility is to

note that the entire sentence except the clause "and personi.
property" explicitly concerns the home and property used
therewith.

In light of the awk\-1ard construction of the

sentence which places a limit on the amount of exempti~
allowed immediately after "personal property" and not afte:
the word "homesteads" upon which the limit 1·1as placPcl it
becomes arguable that the drafters of the constitution wet'
intending to provide the legislature with .cm <'!'1 " 11 u•n>!
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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bz

)H·orcrty t.Jx exemptions to individuals in their

",. 0 ,1 ti:ccr

~~ership

of personally used property.

Such an interpretation picks up support when one
observes the construction of this same provision prior to the
1958 P,mendment.

The provision read :
The legislature may
from taxation of homes,
property, not to exceed
and homesteads, and $300

provide for the exemption
homesteads, and personal
$2,000 in value for homes
for personal property.

After reading the two versions of this same basic
provision it seems conceivable that when the people voted
~

replace the phrase "and $300 for personal property" with

"and all household furnishings,

fixtures, and equipment used

exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in
maintaininq a home for himself and family" that their intent
i:as to provide an inflation adjusting change necessary to
ensure that all of an individual's personalty was exempt.
That is to say, they substituted a different limitation on
the a:no-1Jn J...c

"'
OL

Persona 1 property t h at cou ld. b e

,_ d •

exemp~e

~ther than $300, which initially rnay have been sufficient
to provide exemption for an individual's household furnishings' etc., the people provided that all such i terns were to
be e

x~mpt as long as used in maintaining a place of abode.
,,·loptinr_J

-_ ri_

j _
1

:

. r·

1I

this construction only provides the
01·1""

lunity of exempting personal property
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used in connection v1ith

;1

honl•' or ntlH'r pl<Jcn of ubn_'

would deprive the petitioner of its claim lo

iH1

E'>:ciritio,;

from taxation of its personal pro;:ic1_-Ly used in carryinci

01

,,

its commercial endeavors since corpor<-tte propertv, evc,:i th:,of a charity, could find no constitutionally sanctioned
exemption.
Another possible alternative to the above constrnc•
of this exemption provision is to read the sentence so as
to grant the legislature the power to exempt
(2)

(1) hoMes;

homesteads, with a limit of a $2000 exemption for eacr,;

( 3) unlimited power to exempt all personal property, 11here"1
situate and by whomever owned and used; and
furnishings,

(4) all househc'

fixtures and equipment with the limi tatio

1

1

th;'

such i terns may only be exempted if used exclusivelv by the
owner at his place of abode and only if the item is used i~
maintaining a home.
Adopting this construction would provide petitioner
an opportunity of claiming it may be entitled to the n:,ceS'c
constitutionally sanctioned

exem~tion.

This e~:e:"'ptior. de;;~

upon the E.R.I. 's ability to find a statute wherein the le,:'
ture exercised its power.

'
lf
The only legislation which seeris to concern itse
with charities and their ownershiri and use of prof-wrh is
Utah Code Ann.

(1953)

§§

59-2-30 Lo 31.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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...

This section is intended to clarify the
scope of exemptions for property used
cxciusivelv for either religious worship
or charitable purposes provided for in section
2 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the
state of Utah.
This section is not intended
to expand or limit the scope of such exemptions.
Any property whose use is dedicated to religious
worship or charitable purposes including property
which is incidental to and reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of such religious worship
or charitable purposes, intended to benefit an
indefinite numer of persons is exempt from
taxation if all of the following requirements
are met:
(1) The user is not organized to provide a
profit from the use of the property.
(2) No part of any net earnings, from the
use of the property, inures to the benefit of
anv private shareholder or individual, but
any net earnings shall be used directly or
indirectly, for the charitable or religious
purposes of the organization.
(3) The property is not used or operated by
the organization or other person so as to benefit
any officer, trustee, director, shareholder,
lessor, member, employee, contributor, or any
other person through the distribution of profits,
payment of excessive charges or compensations.
(4) Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or
abandonment of the user no part of any proceeds
derived from such use will inure to the bcnef it
of any private person.
Respondents

sub~it

that this provision was not the

result of the legislature's exercising its constitutional
authnr

lo "providf' for the exemption from taxation of

· · · pcr':onal propertv."

Respondents reach this conclusion

b·c \·:a.,,' r,.c lh c t. o 11 ow1ng
·
·
ana 1 ysis.

-7-
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The first t~o sentences set forth the inLc~t u
lesrislu.ture in pussing the provision and clcfin.2 s th" scop,I;_

of its

enact~ent.

1\fhen the first sentence rei.lds, "This sw

is intended to clarify the scope of exemptions for propert,
used exclusively for either religious worship or ch_aritab~
purposes provided for in section 2 of Article XIII of the
Constitution of the state of Utah," i t directs the reac1er
to go to Article XIII Section 2 of the Utah Constil.ution
propert~' "used

find the exemption dealing with the use of

exclusively for either religious worship or charitable
purposes."

In doing so one finds a particular provision th'

reads:

• lots with the buildings thereon use_c_1__exclusi'

".

for either religious worship or charitable purposes (the c,:,
phraseology used in section 30).
taxation."

. sh al 1 be exen1p t fror,

It is to be noted that this provision of the

cons ti tut ion only deals with real property-- lots
buildings thereon.

1·:

l th the

It cannot be said that section 30 1,•as 2

attempt to exercise the constitutional grant to e·.:i•rnpt
personal property from taxation.
.
.
.
c~c1clecl
c,upport frOJ1i th'
Such an interpretation
gains
"
~
following sentence of section 30.

It reads,

11

This sectiofl

is not intended to expand or limit the scope of such
.

' t l - sl iteci t~··

The legislature could be said to have exp 1 ici

Y · '
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s~ct i o;.;

" "
The Commission submits that there currently exists

rC' c::C?r1c;tion fror;i taxo.tion of the personal property of a
charity in Utah under either construction of the Constitutional
provision dealing \·Ti th the legislature's pmver to grant
execipt.ions from property taxation.

Since the Constitution

provides that all tangible prooerty in the state not exempt
undPr the Cons ti tut ion is taxable,

the Commission urges this Court to

affin1 the decision of the Utah State Tax Commission in
denying Eyring Research Institute an exer:iption from
taxation of its personal property.

POI\JT II
PF.TIT lO:ff:E' S COMl'!ERCIAL ACTIVITIES 1\PB ~JOT CHARITABLE
Fl i·Jl\TURE AS THEY DO :JOT RELIEVE STATE AND LOCAL
GO\JI:R;~tlENTS OF ANY BURDKJ ;WR DO THE:Y EXTEND DIRECT
TO TllE CL:tiERAL PUBLIC
i~'nli::c o';::.'.1e:r- c:1a.ritable cases C.ecideci heretofore by

this court 1·1here traditional charitable activities have been
the instant controversy presents a

-9Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

questi0'1 of first irnprcssion--can an oryani zat iol! "'''Jo ;::c
co!11IT1ercial endeavor that does not gratuitously ]Jrondc uir
benefit to the general public be titled a charity?
The Utah Supreme Court has had several opµortuniti:·:
to rule in the charitable exemption area of Utah law, but
each instance the case presented a fact situation wltere
traditional charitable activities were being carried on.
Salt Lake Lodge '.'Jo.
P. 192

(1911);

85 B.P.O.E. v.

~

Groesbeck_, 40 Utah 1, )!,,

Benevolent and Protective Order of Elks :10.:

v. Tax Commission,

'J3G P.

Piece of Imoroved Real

2d 1214

Propert~·,

(Ctal1 1975); Bak• r v. On·•
0

570 P.

2d 1023

(Utah 19771:

entities seeking exemption were eng:iged in traditional chaff'
activites such as aid to the poor, needy and destitute.
In the above cases as well as Youth Tennis 1·~:
v. Tax Commission,

554 P.

2d 220

(Utah 197G), volu11tary lace:

another traditional charitable activity, was utiliz.cd to
effectuate the carrying out of the various charitc1hle purpos;
In the instant case, however, we find a cor[Joration '''
professio:E1l individuals drawing a salary on the p.ir ':'it>
paid in the industry.

t.

The services renderc:d are bou9iit anc

paid for and in several instances are used to

th~ e"~111sivc
~
.. ~

and pecuniary advantage of the entity for whom the
has been performed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bz

J\:1
~t

al most- iclcn ticzl1

ca!'iC' to the instant one

:cl t to thr su0re:<1P Court of Minne so ta recently.

i_nesc::nl~ed

In

·:ort'.1_§_tar__F~csearch Institute v. County of Hennepin,
/cl 754

(1975),

rehearing denied 236 N.\·L

court was faced with the issue

2d 767,

236 N.W.

the Minnesota

of deciding whether a non-profit

corporation which was engaged in applied research was
entit.led to a tax exemption as a ''purely public charity", which
is akin to our constitutional requirement that the proDerty
seehng exemption be used "exclusively for
µurpos es .

.

. charitable

11

Like E.R.I.'s operation, the research organization
in the ~1innesota case,

North Star Research Institute, provided

research services in significant degree at the request of
Federal and State governmental agencies with a substantial
a~unt

of services being performed for private organizations.

Examples of the research provided:
uses for woste products;

The discovery of commercial

the discovery of devices to control

ro:lert:::· in grain storage facilities;

the analysis and refine-

eie::t o~ (Hlli:-ig ar:d accounting arocedures;

etc. --all similar

ir, n0ture to E .R.I. • s prOJeCts.
·
J-~v0;1
0

after finding that :-iorth Star Research was not

P~ratc' 1 i £or the prcuniary advantage of the individuals
Inc:titute and that any profits which 1.vere

\.hr,
. .~ i
i

'

II

1 Ln irnnrovc

t~e

research potential of
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::orth Star,

th2 l!inn2sota court hcl,1 tlvtt ;Jnrt'.: '.oLi: "c,.,

Institute failetl to sustain its burden of-

D
·
~ rovJ_n9

c.;nti~lc,

to exemption when it held:
(1)
To be exempt from taxation, property
must be put to a use which is purely charitabl~
and public;

(2)
A significant part of the use to which
the property of North Star is put involves
applied research for private business enterprises engaged in business for profit;
(3)
Any private business contracting with
North Star to conduct research acquires an
exclusive proprietary interest in the information developed, which it can use to its
advantage in the market place and which, if
it sees fit it can preclude others from using
by obtaining patents;
( 4)
The fact that a substantial part of t 1e
research is done for governmental agencies, ff'::lera:
and state, does not make North Star "purely"
charitable and public;
1

(5)
If the research done for private enterpr:"
is so minimal in comparison to the total as to be'.:
no legal consequence, the record fails to derno:is':r':

it.

E.R.I's Articles of Incorporation set fort~ its

in the public interest, but its articles also grant the ;;o:::
r·

to do research for profit making entities Hhen Article-'·
therein reads:
The purposes for which th0 corporation is
formed are:
(d)

* * *

Tn

pronotc and

fo~tor
c

of science in t~1~ c1Pveloo . . . 1•·n t () !
and
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney industr-/
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·c2tlC"Ic'2r hJ.s

utilizcu this L:rnguage to provide

c0rviccs to several non-governmental entities such
a
·~-~ta1~

t

1~rocessing

Sell,

Uta~

con;:Ja11y, a mushroom processing company,
Power antl Light, etc., which all utilize

... ·o infor'T'.ution in their profit making activities.

T:1e l-!inne?sota court found suc)1 a power dispositive
-.;2;1 it stated at length:
A second characteristic of ~orth Star, and the
critical one, is that information developed as a
result of the research is not nade available to the
public generally or to industry generally.
Instead,
the knowledge becomes the exclusive pro?erty of the
0jrofit-mai~ing enterµrise for which it was researched.
It is aporopriate, and probably necessary, that
this exclusive entitlement to the product of the
research be granted to the business organization which
requested and, in part at least, paid for it.
But
a process which enables one business to improve
its competitive position wit~ respect to others
in the same field cannot be said to be a "charity"
as that term has been generally understood, even
in its broadest sense.
And the ;iurpose of improving
directly L1e profit-ma}~ing '.:iotential of a private
':Juc;iness is not a "public purpose" in a sense
comparable to such purposes as the relief of poverty
and sickness, the generally dissemination of knowledge, and the encouragement of religion, science,
and the arts.
"Charity" in the strict sense and
2c~lied researc~, w~ether motivated directly and
-'--~--·:'Jia.":.c J. .. t~· ~:.'.i:-:~2:--!i ::aria:-~ c'.J:--:.siderations or
-:-:-=:_-1:;::.Ger~,--=

"",s

·=<:

:::r::.:it, ar2

::cL.~i

i!".1"'.")0rtant to t:1e

social welfare.
T~e difference lies ln the fact
th::o.t. ilpplied research immediately and directly
r~lated to ~rofit-nakino activities is better able
t.hun purel . charitabie ~ctivities to share the burdens

') _: tax.:: ti C) ~-,

•

co•;r'_ i"1s inJirectly indicated that a co1mnercial
2

1t1or nav orevent the entitv from attaining
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Some cases dctc:rmining property ~'artially tad
clo so on the basis that ti1e property is partiall
used. for commercial purposes, eg., renti~g of a'
portion of the pro)Jerty, even though the rents au
applied for charitable purposes.
Here we have no.
question of co=ercial use versus charitable usE;
because there is no )art of t'.1e subject premises
which are used commercially - no part is rented
and no income is received.
536 P.2d at 1217 tolS.
Petitioner cites definitions given by various
to the term charity.

A COITlI'lOn thread found runniny in

definitions and the one relied on by E.R.I. for its

cou'f
sue.~

exc~oti

Th c~ courts

is the lessening of the burdens of government.

found this criterion to be important since the pocver to t;x
rests upon necessity and is essentL1l to t':1e exisLcnce oft
state in its efforts to provide services to meet the genen.
welfare needs of its citizens.

The Cons ti tu ti on 1i.1s carver

out an exemption from sharing the burdens of government for
ties, which exemption the courts have found to be based up~·
·
'
·
be!10fits f~c:ri
premise
tnat
t h e state is
presurne01 t o rec;~ive
__

the property of charities

equivale~t

at least to tl1c public

revenue that would otherwise be derived from iL.
In the instant controversy the state or in the

politic~!

instance of the pro;::ierty ta:< involved hE:rein its
l
subdivisions who receive the tax revenue co

henefits \·Jhich relieve the burden of

r1ot

;,1·,,\•1·:!111'1

l_.('cciVP

l'''
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11

c:ic

ri1-ni
,

l'ction,
0i1d

ci. ty an:l county rodr1 systems,

watc~r

tlir' multitucle of other local services.

Jct 5 presented at the hearing indicate that in terms of
percent of its efforts go to Federal
governmc,11t projects which only remotely would ever ease the
burclcn on the local governments which provide services to
Eyrinq Hesearch Institute.

Even more obvious is the

[act the very city providing the services mentioned was

required to pay $17,265.00 to E.R.I. for some research as to
the impact of locating a resort in the Provo area.

Even

assumincJ that such activity is of the type that the govern-

would ordinarily find necessary to preserve the general

ment

,,.1clfctre of its citizens, and hence would fit one of the legal
requi.reJTlents that charities provide services for the public
1·1elfart",

the fact remains the burden on Provo and its

tazpayrrs w0s in no way lessened as they presumably paid
the fair market value for the services rendered!

This situation hardly seems of the type that the
~-:::-:::--:_.srs

o:

the Cons~itution 2nC Statutes of Vtah in.tended

co f,•::~j-·.2 c;pecial tax treatment.

Anot'.'ler fact brought out

at f:ormul !tearing which indicates that E.R. I. 1 s operation is
if -f~r
. 1 in
.
.
.
- - "t"··c
"-"- ' commercia
nature t h an it
is
c h ari. t a bl e
11
'

0

1
""" i:c 0

J,i,r

is th0

fact that E.R.I. 's president received a

~-'''1 honu~ for a joh well done in 1975.

Respondents

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15-

submit that individuals cncpqed jn
usually would not be expectinq
activity.

chilritabl<~

r~onetary

activir_i,,~

rc':.'ards for

such

In fact, this seems to deprive the activity of

its charitable nature altogether.
Petitioner cites judicial language to the effect
that a charity's engaging in commercial activities will
not deprive it of its charitable status.

However,

Youth Tennis Foundation of Utah v. Tax Commission, ::_upra,
cited by petitioner, stated the rule to be that comr;iercial
activities that are "incidental to and consistent with
charitable purposes do not change.

• [the] character [of

the charity) or deprive it of its attendant protections."
554 P.2d at 223.
The case at hand does not fit the case to which
such language was aimed--where a charity with cleacly
established charitable purposes and activities engages ~
incidental activities such as the selling of goods in
competition with private enterprise.

Here, where the

entity's entire activities are commercial in nature the
rule is simply not applicable.
Justice Maughan continued in Youth Tennis by stati"---~----

that as long as the charity's incidental commercial
were correlated to the prudent management of its
in accomplishing its commitment to supportillCJ the

-16-
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,:;r payn1ent of a $10,000.00 bonus, substantial in any
husiness settiny,

in adclition to the E.R.I.'s president's

clready competitive salary simply does not seem to be the
1rndcnt management of resources toward lessening the burdens

nf government ctnd improving the quality of life of man.
Such a reward seems unnecessary for an individual working

for the betterment of man.

POINT III
THE BURDEN IS UPON THE APPLICANT TO ESTABLISH
EXEMPTION FROM AD VALOREM TAXATION, AND SAID
EXEMPTIONS WILL NOT BE AIDED BY JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION BUT MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST APPLICANT.
The basic premise in all property tax cases has
been that 011 tangible property situate in the State of Utah
is subject to taxation.

Article XIII Section 2 Utah Const.

Exemptions from this basic premise are provided.

This Court

~as provided the tests to be used in ascertaining when the

In !'~rke.£__~'1..:_Quinn,

23 Utah 332, 64 P. 961

(1901),

Court stated the general rule to be:
.all property of what kind soever,
a1 11 1 by whornso<;ver owned is subject to taxation;
~nrl when any kind of property is exempt, i t
'',,w;titutcerc> an exception to this rule.
•rhe
11
'
"1' tile rule is that it is just and
: " I d•I,, I J1,1t every species of property within
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the state should be0r its equul pcoport iJ):i
of the burc1ens of the qovcrnrient.
',!he;-;,
therefore, an ovner clJims that certain
property is exempt from taxation, the burden
is upon him to show that it falls within the
exception.
~_£1__~Xemption_ wi__JJ,__~ot be aided by
judicial interpretation.
It must Se-shown
exist by express -terms o-Cth._e_enactmen-Cl·1l1'Ccl1 it;,
claimed grants it.
'The presumption i-sthat-211--=exemptions intended to be g-ranted werc>--,Tr-cin-feciin express terms.
In such cases the~-ulc;--or~
strict constru-ction -a:D-plTc~-and;-in--ordc>r--fo
relieve any species of pr-operty from i tsd-i:ieand just proportion of the burdens of t~-
government, the language relied on as crcatinq
the exemption should be so cleEi-rasriotto adr;it
of reasonable controversy about its meaning;
for all doubts must be resolved against the
exemption.
The power to tax rests upon necessi~
and is essentia1- to the existence of the state.'
(Emphasis added.)

to

An exception to this general rule would scern to h,,,
been carved out as noted in Benevolent and Protective Ordil _
Elks No.

85 v. Tax Commission of the State of Utah, 536 P.'

1216 (Utah 1975), when the Court stated:
• There is, however, an exception to
this general rule, and statutes exempting propert•·
used for educational and charitable purposes or
for public and charitable purposes or for public .
worship, under the great weight of authority, sho •.
receive a broad and :c:::ire libecal const:-'.lc~i"~· t·or.
those exempting procertv used with a view to
or profit only.
Th~ re~son for the rule is th 3 c:,
·
- lus1l'elv
the state, by exempting
property usec1 exc
-"
for one or more of the purposes mentioned froP
taxation, is presumed to receive benefits froP
the property ~quivalent at le2st to the public
revenue that would otherwise be derivecJ frori it.
Respondents would submit th2t this rule o
does not aid E.R.I.

in the inst2nt controvors
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f

,. rr "

cnn"

tnz

le:

1 :, tc:1clecl

"S

l.ci !Jc applied

;J Utah 1, 120 Pac.

192

(1911).

in cases like Salt Lake Loder'"

Benevolent and Protective

nder
of --Elks No. -------·
S':l v. Tax Com:nission, supra; where traditional
----~

~----

c'iuitable activities were taking place.

The issue was whether

those chadtable activities were sufficient in light of other
activities to entitle the entity to claim exemption under a
ectrticular provision of statute or constitution.

The rule

is to broadly construe the statute to see if i t allows the
e:ility to use it to gain tax exemption as a charity.
?espondents will submit that the issue before this Court is
t':hether the activities of E.R.I. are charitable, and not
1·hethe1 E. P.. I. 's charitable activities are of the type or
of sufficient number to entitle it to an exemption llnder
the Utah Constitution and Statutes granting exemption.
0

cspondents will stipulate that if petitioner's

research activities are charitable then i t is entitled to
a tax eYcrnption.

The intent of the above argument is to

~"ese'lt t;1e oro:-iosi tiori

that doubts as to the charitable

nsture of E.R.I. 's research activities should be construed
j:i

fuvor of tuxation.

This posturP was enunciated by a Massachusetts court
i·

Il'-'_:S_t()n ~-l2'.'.:"1_b_c.T_ _oJ_S:onul15'.:.!S:_e__~Assessors of Boston,

315

:·.s. 712, 5~ ll.~.2.1 J'l9 (1954), wherein the court stated:
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_,,,,..

I:

Notwithstdnding the law's acknowleJqm~n~
in which charity rnilv
fJ_nd expression, the more remote the objcccts ~iid
mc0 ~hods become from the traditionally recogni 2 ,-.f:
obJ ects and methods the more care must be taken
to preserve sound principles and to avoid umic:a,111
exemptions from the brudens of govcrnJTtent. This
statement becomes especially pertinent v1here the
alleged charity operates in the fields of trade
and commerce. * * * A foundation for indusLrial
research for the sole purpose of discovering anr'
making generally available more efficient methods o'.
production and distribution might be a ch0ritv. B,
of the multitude of trade organizations and associations existing today in all branches of
industry and commerce it is believed that few
could pass the test.
o~ the mani Fold new forms

The petitioner cited language of the Color0do Suore
Court decision in United Presbyterian Association
?f County of Jefferson_, 167 Colo.

485,

_v~ Comm1s:'

448 P.2d %7 (1969),

also picks up this distinction.
The Colorado court stated:
Our prior decisions have consistently zHlherd
to the princiole that charitable purpose _<L' __ a~ end
will be strictly construed, but if the end be
clearly established as charitable then thr' rneans
used to achieve that end will be liberal~\'_ c_onstru_i:__
as a use for chari tablce purpo-se:---CEmphas i_:; added.I
The rule statins; that stat<Jtes iw•ol•.'inJ charit>bi'
exemptions are to be broadly construe d was rlo t in L:cnded to
provide a broad and liberal interpretation of whJt is a rho'
.
I
court Is lantJllilgc i~
This is illustrated by picking
up t1e
L
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1

And inanifcstly the purpose of the statute
in l'YcmptinCJ propertv usecl for charitable
purposes is to encourage the promotion of
institutions and organizations having for
their object the care and maintenance of the
indigent and destitute citizen, the helpless
orphan and the poor who are sick and afflicted,
and whose charity and ministrations in these
respects correspondingly relieves the state of
such burdens.
120 Pac. at 8 to 9.
Since the sole issue before this court is whether
E.R.I. is a charity at all,

the rule of statutory construction that

nrovides that exemption statutes are to be liberally construed
to see if they apply to the subject charity is simply not

applicable to the case at bar wherein the dispute centers on
·.·;hether a charity even exists.
POINT IV
EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION MUST BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
SO AS NOT TO OVERBURDEN NONEXEMPT TAXPAYERS WITH
PAYING MORE THAN THEIR FAIR SHARE OF THE COSTS OF
GOVERNMENT.
Found throughout the decisions discussing exemptions
from taxation is the basic taxing premise that all propert?

for suc]i u premise is that it is just and equitable that every
SYJeciE·::.; of

property should bear its equal proportion of the

01

quvernment ..

Jrdcn::> 0f
0

Inherent in this premise is the fact

11 r·opcrty requires many if not most of the services

In case of fire,

the
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-l !''

property is sold, sellers

anc~

of the recording system.

Exarnp]('S c;o

bu\'ecs

usu~; 11~· ru': 0
0:1

::J,,n

2nd on.

a property becomes exempt fror1 ta:<ation it shifts
the cost of the services the government pro·rides on:o
nonexempt entities.

As the number of exemptions c;ro.,s

in a taxing area, the amount of tax required o E nonexempt taxpayers correspondingly increasc::s.

1'/hile

the statistical data is not available which would
indicate the value of the property lost listed on

t~

tax rolls due to exemptions, several other areas of the
country have such data available.

In a report pcepared b.

the Citizens Budget Commission, Inc., of New York
.,

entitled Real Estate Tax Exem2!_ions:

TiBe

F~_it_C:.,~n';c

published in April of 1977, it was indicated that tile
assessed value of tax exempt properties in New York Ci~
amounted to $25,208 million.

This had the effect of fo·c-

going S2, 216 million in real estate til.xes which would he·
acded 70 ;:iercent to the S3, 122 :-i.llio:-i ·~·f
believed collectible.

2

cc1l

('S~ 3 ::c

Of this uDoc1nl

that $334 million was lost due to non-governmental,

.
3
charitable type exemption.

1

Available at 110 East 42ncl Strec't, ll,.,,. Yn1·k,
10012 (212) 687-07] 1.

2

Ic1.

at 1.
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i]e\':

ii'1~

o'i the distr-ibution of thE' tax burden.

With the

er10;·1n,)us value lost from the tax base due to exemptions,
rcsponients urge this Court to seriously look at its
1udicial decisions and the direct impact they have on
the shifting of the tax burden onto the already distraught

citizen-taxpayer.
If the citizenry wanted to expand its tax subsidization of worthy causes to include educational and scientific
enterprises,

let them make it express; as they did in the

Federal taxing scheme wherein scientific enterprises are
afforded an express tax subsidy.
property does not find any

Utah's taxation of real

Federal counterpa1l

and the

constitutional exempting language governing cha1ities is
si9nificcrntly different than the Federal langu.t 11e.

In this

respect the following language of this court in Friendship
1'1_i1_12__CJ_£_~_~1]-)_.__ -""-~ Tct~Commis__,,_~o~,

26 Utah 2d 227, t\87 P.2d 1272

In this regard the court
s ta tc-cl :

The fctct that plaintiff is exempt From
fcJeral tctxation under the provisions of
the- Jntcrn21l Revenue Code, is not determinative,
although the nonprofit aspect would be a
nr.~ccssa 1·y inqreclient of a qualifying
chc1r[tci!il0 operution.
487 P.2cl at 127G to 77.
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for subsidization of scientific 011tccqjriscc; is :.ir.,,,1.
not justified in this case.
The Conunission would also urc3c the Court to not~·~..
fact that most corporations, profit and non-profit., provici:
valuable and needed services to the citizenry.
that Petitioner is a

Th0 fact

nonprofit corporation provicllng a

highly regarded service cannot be dispositive in light of
the fact t1:1at about one-sixth4 of all corporutions in Utah
are incorporated under the

nonprofit laws of Utail.

To

broaden the charitable status to include non-profit corpora:.
providing needed and beneficial service could conceivably
have an enormous impact on the tax base.

Responde11 t:s siP•.0 1.

urge the Court to review the propriety of extendinc1 the scoec
of the charitable exemption any further than it is

POINT V
OC.l A \\i'RIT OF REVIEW THE COM!HSSION' s DECI:;J1)~! Sf!OJcc'
ONLY BE DISTURBED IF FOUND TO BE ARBITTu\RY ;1:JU CA?i::'

This Court has held with the majority of Courts
''[bl ecause

r

O::!::

tr:?·

'.
.,
. 1
.I--.
'' l. c'1 t..ri.·c_ ,ulnini:::t~:·
t:.1e
res-rJor;sioi
lLies
-,,,;icn
,_.,_,.. 1_:

tive agency is charged, and its presumed knowledge ,ind exo,:
in thut

field

of action,

4

.

i t should

b~

allowed Con ~ri' dt~.r·c· lile free:.

with as little judicial interference as

' f :; I l 1 .- ·' (l ff l···:
Statistics obtuined from the Secrntarl (
1
,January 5, 1979, sho\\'ir1<J J tot;cd of ~'.l, 71 1 L~,i
i·i·.".

and of:

that number 6,GC)2 beiriq

irh~or1•nr,1t

profit corporution luws of Utah.

1 ,J

:r'
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[ t:1~· courts]

,,_tc:rn1initiuns,

arcc rc:luctant to intrude into the agency's

and will not do so unless i t a2pears th;it

ariency has cic ted in excess of its authority, or so unreasondbly that it should be deemed capricious and arbitrary.•·
Beirne v. Mitchell,

llo.

15482

(Utah, November 15,1978).

Respondents submit that it was soundly reasonable for
the Commission to have denied exempt status to a scientific
organization where no clear exemption can be found in the
Ltah

Cons ti tut ion, statutes or decisions.

COl"CLUSION
The Utah Constitution currently provides for the
taxation of all tangible prop2rty in the state except if
exempted by the laws of the United States or the Utah Constitution.

The only ex£)res s exemption found in the cons ti tutio!'

is for lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for
Chari table ['Urpose S.
~IO?erty,

Since the prooerty in dispute is personal

this exemi::ition is inapplicable.
exe~ution

a9plicable to

E~ring

The only other

Research Institute's

uraperty is one enabling the legislature to exempt
ccrtciin ot 11er classes of property.

This provision can be

tcd so as to only grant the legislature the opporproperty used by an individual in
Ti1is interpretation leaves petitioner
c,',

L11c

leCji s la ture has failed to expressly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and-2')Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to a charity.
the Utah code conceivably dealing with personal
a charity, Section 59-2-30, provides tliat it is only in:c·:
to clarify the exemption granted to chariliL's
buildings.

1-.·_i

th lots c:

After listening to all legislative deb1te co:-

cerning Utah Code Annotated §59-2-30,

this writer can re]:,

to the Court that the entire debate centered on 1·:ly, s'.10J'..
tlloug~t

exempt and never even hinted that the legislo.turc

they 1·1ere picking up their heretofore dormant cons l. i tut:c ..
power to exclude a charity's personal property fror.1 the :.
rolls.

Respondents submit that there currently exists no

provision in Utah la1v exempting petitioner's persn11al proo,·
regardless of its characterization as a ci1arity

11onc~ 0 r:

01·

For purposes of arguing against the peti t

10!

1

C'r' s ;,. !

position that i t is a charitable organization ent.i tlerl to
property exemption,
granting of a

that

the Commission would point out

$10,000.00 bonus to its presiclent d";>rivest·

corporation of its

non~ro::i t

status as such an a··~

tutes no more than a return of :-xcofil tc

a.i

offic

1

0
:

corporation in direct contravention of the requi rcr:i:nts
enjoying

nonprofit status.

Since this Court has
.

non0rofit

:>

,

status is essential to a corporation ;;

that i t ic; entitled to an excmr,tion as
has deprived it~clf of any clai~ for

ch _1 1· l L 1:: 1·
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0
:

:_:ta ted ~

,,i11imin'

for

ti1,,'

ta>: year in which the bonus was paicl.
Secondly,

· 1

the cornmissio:i \IOuld urge the Court to

tnc tact that petitioner is engaged entirely in comn1ercial

acci1cities and never gratuitously offers its so called
charitable services to the public as rendering E. R. I.
of claiming exempt status.

incapable

Such commercial activities place

petitioner in a different clas3 of organization than has
0reviously been the subject of review by this Court.

The

decisions which have hacl such an op2ortunity have held that
while the commercial activity engaged in by a research organization is commendable that they do not amount to charitable
activity entitling the entity to claim an exemption.
The fact that petitioner engages in activities which
?rovide highly regarded beneficial services can not be persuasive
since most businesses, profit and r.onprofit,
services.

provide similar

This must follow or such corporations would cease

to exist.
Petitioner's activities entail the performing of
rese2:rc·1 :er ;)ri1I2-'c.e e:lterpriss -.-.-~i:::--1 r:::sy use the information

for its own exclusive and pecuniar1 use.

Such activity is

simply not charitable in the sense that the constitutional
intended in providing for exemption from taxation.
f<espondents urge this Court to sustain the Commission's

~C'c ;, ~ '·')''

:> ':

not

bc i nq arbi tr ar'/ nor capricious·
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D.7\TED this

9t~

da~'

of Januai:y,

l'.J79.

Resp~ctEully

suLmittcG,

ROBERT B. HA"SJ:::J
Attorney General of Uw state:

_l}JLz~{
MARK K.

BUCHI
.
Assistant Attorney Gener~
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Respondent
State Tax Commission

CERTIFICATE OF
I

~LAILING

hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct.

postage pre-paid, of Respondents Brief on Appeal to Mr. ~
Dayle Jeffs, Attorney for Petitioner,
Utah

84601, on this

90 North llHI East, Pre

day of January, 1970.
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